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ABSTRACT 
Arrow' s result linking� ante Pareto optimality for a pure 
trade world to competitive equilibrium positions under a complete set 
of contingent claim markets is summarized, as is his reinterpretation 
of � � optimality for the case of an economy with active spot 
markets. Possible difficulties arising from this reinterpretation are 
noted. The final section of the paper examines conditions under which 
an economy with active spot markets will achieve an � ante optimum in 
the original sense of this term and summarizes the behavior of such an 
economy. 
EX ANTE OPTIMALITY AND SPOT MARKET ECONOMIES 
Stuart Burness, Ronald Cummings and James Quirk* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The most important result in the literature dealing with the 
optimality properties of the competitive equilibrium under uncertainty 
is Arrow' s proof (1964) that in a pure trade world of risk averse 
consumers, and with a complete set of markets in contingent claims, 
any� � Pareto optimum can be achieved as a competitive 
equilibrium, given essentially the same caveats as in the certainty 
case. In Arrow' s original paper on this topic, this result was 
established for a world in which all market transactions take place 
before the state of the world is revealed; no spot markets are 
permitted to function in future periods. In the same paper, however, 
Arrow also considers an alternative institutional arrangement, one in 
which there are ''security' ' markets that operate before the state of 
the world is revealed, a security of type s paying $1 if state of the 
world s occurs, and nothing otherwise. There is a security market for 
every possible state of the world. When the state of the world is 
revealed, spot markets open and consumers can make purchases of goods 
in such markets, using the proceeds from the securities that pay off 
• Burness and Cummings are on the faculty of the University of New 
Mexico, while Quirk is on the faculty of Caltech. This research was 
supported in part by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 
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in that state of the world. Airow shows that if there is agreement 
among consumers as to the market clearing price vectors in these spot 
markets, then again any � ante Pareto optimum can be achieved as a 
competitive equilibrium. 
Airow' s approach was criticized by Radner (1968, 1970), who 
noted that the assumption that spot markets do not open after clearing 
of the markets for contingent claims is highly restrictive, as is the 
assumption in the security market model that there is unanimous 
agreement among consumers as to the market clearing price vectors in 
the spot markets. Radner observed that these assumptions effectively 
rule out consideration of a number of interesting issues in market 
theory including uncertainty about future prices, speculation, 
liquidity, hedging, and so forth. In particular, Radner introduced a 
distinction of critical importance in models of the competitive 
economy under uncertainty, namely the distinction between uncertainty 
about the environment�events over which market participants have no 
control�and uncertainty about events where actions by market 
participants do affect or determine the outcome, such as market 
clearing prices in future spot markets. Radner' s interpretation of 
the Airow model was that it incorporated only uncertainty about the 
environment, but not uncertainty about the equilibrium prices in 
future spot markets. 
This interpretation of the Airow model underlies the exchange 
between Nagatani (1975) and Arrow (1975) on Nagatani' s view that ' '  • • •
there is actually no mechanism (in the Airow model) that generates 
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knowledge of the (spot prices).'' Consequently, Nagatani argues that 
consumers in an Arrow economy with active spot markets will be 
uncertain as to which price vector will prevail in the spot markets at 
the time they make their decisions as to the purchase and/or sale of 
securities. This uncertainty leads in turn to a two-stage dynamic 
programming decision rule for consumers, which results in market 
outcomes that are generally inconsistent with··� ante Pareto 
optimality. 
Airow' s reply to Nagatani introduce'd a new element into the 
;picture: ' ' As Nagatani notes, 11fY construction requires each economic 
I 
agent to be aware of what commodity prices will prevail for each 
possible state of nature. An alternative interpretation (of the 
Airow model) is that the definition of a stat'e of the world includes a 
J 
statement of the prices that will prevail. The money claims, then, 
are payable conditioned on the occurrence of specified possible price 
vectors • • • •  [This] interpretation obviously eliminates a good many 
difficulties; there can be no uncertainty about the prices that will 
prevail in a given state if those prices are made part of the very 
definition of the state. But it must be admitted that there are some 
difficulties with this interpretation. Implicitly, at least, the 
uncertainties in the model are exogenous to the economic system; but 
prices are endogenous to it, and this might complicate our 
understanding of the model. ' '  
We would like to examine the nature of the ' ' difficulties' ' 
that arise in this reinterpretation of the Airow model. Our argument 
is to the effect that Radner and Nagatani have correctly identified a 
fundamental problem with the Arrow model so far as optimality is 
concerned, and that the device of incorporating the market clearing 
spot market price vector into the definition of a state of the world 
resolves this difficulty only by creating other more fundamental 
problems for the concept of optimality under uncertainty. It is 
convenient to begin by restating the basic Arrow model. 
2. THE ARROW MODEL 
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We consider a world in which at time 0, securities paying off 
at the occurrence of various states of the world are bought and sold. 
After this market closes, the state of the world is revealed and at 
time 1, spot markets open and trading in spot markets for commodities 
occurs, following which consumers consume those goods they have 
acquired. This is a pure trade world, with I consumers, C goods and S 
states. 
Let: 
0 
xisc 
x. 1SC
Yis 
number of units of good c in the endowment 
of consumer i in state s; 
number of units of good c consumed by consumer 
i in state s; 
number of ''type s'' securities purchased by 
consumer i, each security promising payment of $1 
if state s occurs. If yis is negative, this
represents the sale of securities rather than 
purchases; 
PS price for a security of type s; 
qsc spot market price in state s for 1 unit of good c;
:rris consumer i's subjective probability as
to the occurrence of state s;• 
ui(J:: . ) = the (measurable) utility function of1S 
consumer i over consumption in state s, where 
xis = (xis1•···• xisc>·
In terms of this notation, an � ante Pareto optimum allocation 
• • • • • x =Cx11 • . • •  , x11; ···• x1s••••• x1s> is an allocation satisfying:
(i) feasibility, that is, 
� x � = � �. for all s, c.
i� 1sc i� 1sc, 
(ii) non-dominance, that is, if x is a feasible allocation with 
� :rrisui(xis)s� > st :rr. ui(x� ) for some i, 1S 1S then
� :rr. ui(x. ) < � :rr. uj(x� ) for some j.
s� JS JS s� JS JS 
Assuming a classical environment with differentiable utility 
functions and interior maximum positions, an�� Pareto optimum 
• For simplicity, we assume :rris > 0 for all i, s.
s 
can be characterized in terms of the marginal conditions derived from 
solving the problem 
max t ai � n. ui(x. ){x.} ifi sfi is is 1 
subject to t x. = t �- for all s, c, where a. is the weight
ifi 1SC ifi 1SC 1 
assigned to consumer i in the welfare function. 
Hence at an�� Pareto optimum we have 
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(nis) (...RJL k) _ (�) (...RJL_/...RJL_) 
nit \axisc� axitd - njt . \axjsc axjtd (1) 
for all i, j, s, t, c, d, together with 
t x. = t �- = for all s, c.
ifi 1SC ifi 1SC (2) 
Consider next a model of a competitive economy with security 
markets open at time 0, with active spot markets at time 1, and with 
consumers in unanimous agreement at time 0 as to the market clearing 
This is thespot market price vector qs associated with any state s. 
version of a security market economy first proposed by !IrCTW. 
Then consumer i acts to solve the problem (at time 0): 
subject to 
st PsYis
s.• 
max 
{yi'xi}
� nisui(xis)sfi 
O and 
ct qscxisc ct_.Jqsc�isc + Yis for all
• The appropriate constraint to impose on time 0 dealings in the
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First order conditions for this problem at an interior maximum 
involve the constraints together with 
(nis ) (JL /JL)-nit axisc /axitd - Psqsc ptqtd for all s, t, c,d.
Since (3) holds for any consumer i and every consumer faces 
(3) 
the same prices in the security and spot markes, this implies that the 
marginal conditions (1) for an�� Pareto optimum are satisfied. 
Moreover, market clearing conditions in the securities markets are 
given by 
2 y. = 0 for all s; 
i=l 1S 
while market clearing conditions in the spot markets are that 
it xisc = t o x. i= 1SC for all s,c. 
(4) 
(5) 
It immediately follows that the competitive equilibrium is � 
ante Pareto optimal, and, under an appropriate distribution of 
endowments among consumers, any � � Pareto optimum can be achieved 
as a competitive equilibrium. This is precisely !%row's second
theorem. But this result relies, of course, on the assumption that 
there is unanimous agreement among consumers as to the spot market 
security markets is problematical. In the formulation presented here, 
a barter type process is assumed in which securities are traded for 
securities. We do not attempt to solve the default problem, which is 
a basic difficulty in futures market-spot market models. See Green 
(1974) and Stigum (1974) for a discussion of the issues involved in 
the default risk controversy. 
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price vector in any state of the world. This gives rise to Nagatani's 
objection that there is no mechanism in the Axrow model that leads to 
this restrictive condition; and in turn this leads to Axrow's 
reinterpretation of his model. 
3 • THE REINTERPRETATION OF THE ARROW MODEL 
The reinterpretation proposed by Axrow in his reply to 
Nagatani fits nicely into the framework outlined above. The only 
change is that up to the present, the symbol nis has referred to
consumer i's subjective probability as to the occurrence of state of 
the environment s, with qs• the spot market price vector in state s,
taken to be known with certainty (and with unanimous agreement) by all 
consumers. In Axrow's reinterpretation, nis is consumer i's
subjective probability with respect to state s, where the 
specification of state s includes not only the state of the 
environment but also the value taken on by the market clearing spot 
market price vector. There is no longer any need to assume that there 
is unanimous agreement among consumers as to the spot market price 
vector in any state of the world, since the spot market price vector 
is now part of the specification of a state of the world. With this 
reinterpretation, the number of states has been expanded, of course, 
but otherwise the argument given above applies in its entirety so that 
again any£.!. ante Pareto optimum can be achieved as a competitive 
equilibrium. There is, however, one essential difference between this
result and Axrow's original result, namely that the probabilities used 
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in defining an£.!.� Pareto optimum now refer not to exogenous 
states of the environment but rather to states of the world specified 
both in terms of exogenous states of the environment and endogenous 
market clearing spot market price vectors. 
It is here that the ''difficulties'' arise that Axrow was 
referring to in his reply to Nagatani. By incorporating the 
probability beliefs of consumers as to spot market price vectors into 
the definition of an ex ante optimum, a number of paradoxical 
complications arise. To begin with, the definition of an£.!. ante 
Pareto optimum has now been tied directly into one specific 
institutional device for allocating resources, namely a system of 
futures (security) and spot markets. Consider for example the same 
set of consumers placed in the setting of a centrally planned economy. 
We suppose that in this centrally planned economy, once the state of 
the environment is known, the central planning board announces a spot 
market price vector (not necessarily market clearing) to govern 
transactions in that state of the environment, together with some 
rationing rules. At time 0, before the state of the environment is 
known, a market opens in contracts that pay off on the basis of the 
state of the environment and the spot market price vector to be 
announced by the central planning committee. Presumably consumers 
have probability beliefs as to the planning committee's price 
announcements, and will use such beliefs in their dealings in 
contracts; but does this mean that such beliefs should be a part of 
the definition of an£.!. ante Pareto optimum? In terms of Axrow's 
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reinterpretation of the concept, the answer must be yes; in general, 
the definition of an .!,!; � optimum now varies with the institutions 
used to allocated resources, incorporating the probability beliefs of 
consumers as to any random events that can take place in that 
institutional setting. And with different probability beliefs in 
different institutional settings, this means that allocations under 
different institutions will be Pareto non-comparable. This seems to 
imply that it is only in the exceptional case that any ranking at all 
of allocative mechanisms will be possible, because generally 
probability beliefs even as to the same events will differ simply 
because different resource allocation institutions are being employed. 
Moreover, as in the case of a futures market-spot market economy, the 
institutions themselves create uncertainties that are now incorporated 
into the definition of an optimum. Among other things, this certainly 
lessens the policy significance of the fact that a competitive 
equilibrium is an .!,!; ante Pareto optimum. 
Paradoxes relating to both t�e original and the reinterpreted 
notion of .!,!; ante optimality include the following. Hirshleifer 
(1971) has argued that in a pure trade world of identical consumers, 
knowledge at time 0 of spot market prices in time 1 markets or even of 
the state of the environment at time 1 has no social value; on the 
other hand, consumers are willing to expend sizeable amounts of 
resources to acquire such information because of the private 
(distributional) gains that are possible through speculation. 
Hirshleifer argues that this introduces an inefficiency into the 
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system. But under either the original or the reinterpreted version of 
.!,!; ante optimality, the situations before and after the expenditure of 
resources to acquire information are both optimal, since the 
probability beliefs of consumers differ in the two situations, and in 
both cases a complete set of contingent claim and spot markets exist. 
On the other hand, given the expenditure of resources to acquire 
information, it is possible through lump sum transfers to make every 
individual better off (.!,!; post) in every state of the environment, if 
resources are not expended in information gathering. An even more 
striking instance is the case in which there is no uncertainty about 
states of the environment on the part of consumers, so that in the 
absence of futures markets, Pareto optimality is achieved by simply 
,, 
' 
equating marginal 
·rates of substitution between goods among consumers 
in spot markets. But establishing a futures market now leads to a new 
set of .!.! ante optimality conditions because of the possibility of 
speculating in terms of future spot market prices, and another (Pareto 
non-comparable) set of optimality conditions covering the case in 
which resources are expended for information gathering as well. 
Finally, there is the problem of endogenous probability 
beliefs, as emphasized by Radner (1970). Beliefs as to future spot 
market prices presumably are influenced to some degree by market 
clearing prices on futures markets. In the extreme case of an 
individual who believes that markets are efficient in the strict sense 
of the term, the individual's probability distribution over spot 
prices is determined by futures prices. This again raises problems in 
12 
terms of using the notion of � .!!!!.£. optimality to rank or compare 
allocative mechanisms. In fact, given that perturbations of 
institutions lead to effects on market prices (including futures 
market prices). it begins to appear that� ante optimality in the 
reinterpreted sense might lead essentially to no welfare comparisons 
at all. A related set of problems arises from the fact that 
probability beliefs about future spot prices involve beliefs 
concerning other individuals' subjective beliefs as to other 
individuals' beliefs. and so on�the so-called ''Keynes problem'' 
(Keynes (193 6, p. 156). This is a further dimension of Nagatini's 
concern as to the mechanism which generates knowledge of future spot 
market prices, and it raises questions as to whether one can expect 
beliefs of consumers with respect to spot market prices to be 
representable in the subjective probability framework. 
It is also of interest that by converting optimality into a 
concept whose specification varies with institutions, the unbiasedness 
property of the competitive equilibrium generally fails. That is, it 
is no longer true that any � ante Pareto optimum can be achieved by a 
system of competitive markets, since there is no mechanism in the 
competitive setting that induces the beliefs that characterize 
optimality in non-competitive settings. Thus in effect the 
reinterpretation of � ante optimality preserves efficiency of the 
competitive mechanism at the sacrifice of unbiasedness. 
As Starr (1973), Barris (1978), Radner (1970), and others have 
pointed out, there are difficult problems in arriving at an acceptable 
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notion of optimality for a world of uncertainty; the arguments pro and 
con� .!!!!.£. and� post optimality reveal some of those difficulties. 
We have no solution to suggest to the problem. but we do want to 
emphasize that both the original and the reinterpreted version of � 
.!!!!.£. optimality do indeed pose difficulties of interpretation. as 
Arrow has noted. And the difficulties are especially pronounced in 
the reinterpreted version since uncertainties introduced into the 
problem solely by the institution generally lead in the direction of 
optimality more or less by default, and destroy the unbiasedness 
property of the competitive mechanism. Given these difficulties, one 
might ask under what conditions does a futures market-spot market 
economy satisfy� .!!!!.£. optimality in Arrow's original sense of the 
term? In the next section we examine the performance of an economy 
with a complete set of contingent claim markets and with active spot 
markets. the contingent claims paying off on the occurrence of states 
of the environment only; we then consider a similar structure for a 
security market-active spot market economy. 
With contingent claims paying off on the occurrence of states 
of the environment and with active spot markets, equilibrium positions 
of this economy are� ante Pareto optimal (in the original sense of 
this term) if and only if all consumers agree with certainty as to the 
spot market price vector that will occur in any state of the 
environment. The same result holds for the security market model. 
Moreover. it is easy to see that this result also extends to the case 
in which contingent claims or securities are indexed by spot market 
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price vectors as well as by states of the environment. 
However, even under this highly restrictive condition 
(unanimous agreement with certainty as to spot market prices), in the 
contingent claim economy there is no assurance that planned purchases 
in spot markets will agree with actual purchases after spot markets 
open, and s peculative gains and losses will typically occur even 
though they are not planned. This paradoxical feature of future 
market-spot market economies was first pointed out by Svensson (1976). 
It is of interest that this does not occur in a security economy as in 
the one proposed in Arrow's original paper. 
4. EX ANTE OPrDlALITY AND ACTIVE SPOT MARKETS 
We can identify two distinct kinds of risk that are present 
when spot markets are active in future periods. There are 
environmental risks, associated with uncertainty as to the state of 
the environment that will occur, and there are market risks, 
associated with uncertainty as to the spot market price vectors that 
will occur in future spot markets. Environmental risks are present 
regardless of the institution adopted to allocate resources, but 
market risks arise only with active spot markets in future periods. 
Market risks are not present in the original Arrow models; either no 
spot markets function or consumers have no uncertainty about spot 
market prices. In the reinterpretation of the Azrow model, market 
risks are present but are ' ' insured against' ' through the purchase and 
sale of securities paying off on the occurrence of specific spot 
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market price vectors. 
We next consider a model of an economy in which, at time 0,  
markets open in contingent claims to commodities, each such claim 
promising delivery of one unit of the specified commodity on the 
occurrence of a specific state of the environment. No securities or 
contingent claims paying off on the occurrence of spot market price 
vectors exist. At time 1, spot markets in commodities open after the 
state of the environment is revealed. This means that at time 0, each 
consumer buys and sells of contingent claim contracts in part on the 
basis of expectations of capital gains at time 1, rather than simply 
on the basis of the consumer's desire for consuming a certain mix of 
goods in that state of the environment. Market risk and speculative 
opportunities arise because of uncertainty about future spot prices. 
We use the same notation employed earlier. In addition, let 
zisc denote the number of contingent claim contracts purchased (or, if
zisc is negative, the number of contingent claim contracts sold) by
consumer i, each such contract promising the delivery of 1 unit of 
commodity c in state of the environment s. In a world with contingent 
claim markets and spot markets, the consumer first enters the 
contingent claim markets at time 0 and then, at time 1, after the 
state of the environment is revealed, he enters the spot markets. We 
use the index t to refer to spot market price vectors, with qstc
denoting the spot price of commodity c in state of the environment s 
and price vector t, and xistc denoting the number of units of
commodity c consumed by consumer i in state of the environment s with 
price vector t. Then, after state s has been revealed, with price 
vector t clearing spot markets, the consumer solves the problem 
mu: ui(x. ) 
{x. } 
1st 
1st 
0 
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subject to 
ct qstcxistc ct qstc (zisc + xisc) with the maximizing 
bundle satisfying 
and 
(�/�)-axistc; axistd - qstc1qstd for all c, d, (8) 
c� qstcxistc = ct qstc (zisc + :isc ) <9> 
Conditions (8) and (9) determine the demand functions for 
consumer in the joint state (s, t) , that is 
xistc xistc ( qst 'Mist) 
where K. t = t q t (z. + :. ) 1S S C 1SC 1SC c= 
Market clearing in the spot markets occurs when 
� x. t = � �- t for all s, c. i6i. 1S C i6i. 1S C (10) 
We might note that the volume of contingent claim contracts 
does not enter directly into this market clearing condition, since 
purchase of such a contract by consumer i involves an offsetting sale 
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by some consumer j. * 
Having characterized the solution to the time 1 problem, we 
now move back.wards in time to examine the time 0 problem. At time 0, 
the consumer decides on the number of contingent claim contracts to 
buy and sell, under uncertainty both as to the state of the 
environment that will occur and as to the spot market price vector 
that will clear markets in that state of the environment. We assume 
that there are T possible spot market price vectors as well as S 
possible states of the environment, with nist denoting consumer i's 
subjective probability as to the state of the environment s and spot 
market price vector t. Then, at time 0, consumer i solves the problem 
max � � nistui (x. t (q t'M. t)) {z.} s6J. t6i. 1s s 1s 1 
subject to � � P z. 
s� c6i. SC 1SC 0 • 
where Psc is the price of a contingent claim promising delivery of 1 
unit of commodity c in state of the environment s. 
Because contingent claim markets exist only for claims paying 
off on the occurrence of states of the environment, z and p are 
indexed only by s and not by t. Assuming an interior maximum, the 
first order conditions for the time 0 problem are given by 
*Of course
.
they enter indirectly, however, since xistc is a function of Mist' which depends on the contracts owned by the consumer. 
( t (___aL)(axistc) ) I ( t (___aL)(axirtd) )t'1. nist axistc aMis qstc t� nirt axirtd aMir �td 
and 
psc = Prd 
for all s, r,c,d,
� t p z. = 0 s� c� SC 1SC • 
With (11) and (12) holding for each consumer i, market 
clearing in the contingent commodity markets occurs when 
where 1 isc = (th 
it z. 1SC 
1isc _ 1jsc 
1ird 
-
1jrd 
0 for all s,c, and 
for all i,j,s,r,c,d  
(___aL)(ax. t ) ) nist axistc aM::tc qstc 
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(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
Given an£!.� Pareto optimum as characterized by conditions 
(1) , assume that the utility function ui is strictly quasi-concave and
twice differentiable so that tho marginal rate of substitution between 
any two commodities for any consumer is 1-to-1 with relative price 
ratios. Then it is clear that conditions (8) and (14) are not 
consistent with an £!. ante Pareto optimum. To put it another way, a 
necessary condition for an ex � Pareto optimum in the original 
version of this term, given the economy as described, is that each 
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consumer knows with certainty the market clearing spot market price 
vector that will occur with any state of the environment. Let t(i, s) 
denote the spot market price vector that consumer i knows with 
certainty will occur in state of the environment s. Then the decision 
problem at time 0 for consumer i becomes 
max � n. . ui(x ) 
{z., X.} s� 1
st(1, s) ist(i, s) 
subject to 
1 1 
s� ct psczisc = 0, and
ct qst(i, s)cxist(i, s)c ct qst(i, s)c(zisc + �isc) for all s.
At an interior maximum we have 
(nist(i. s) ) ( aui I aui ) -nirt(i, r) axist(i, s)c axirt(i, r)d 
for all r, s,c,d. 
qst(i,s)c 
qrt(i, r)d 
Moreover, we can characterize the link between the time 0 
(15) 
price of a contingent claim to a commodity and tho time 1 spot market 
price of the commodity, which is known with certainty, by using the 
envelope theorem, so that 
(� ) aui awi psc = nist(i, s) aM. -�' . _, qst(i, s)c for all s,c,
where W. = � t psczisc1 s� c� . t 
iR..EJC - fuL and aw - nist(i, s)aW . •i s= 1 
(16) 
Condition (16) may be interpreted as follows. At a maximum of 
expected utility, the gain in expected utility from selling one more 
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contingent claim contract at time 0 on c deliverable in state s must 
be equal to the loss in utility that will be experienced when this 
contract is covered in state s times the probability that state s 
occurs. 
Returning to the conditions (15). recall that in the 
characterization of an� .!!!!!!. Pareto optimum from (1). the 
probabilities that appear are n . •  where n. = � n. t for all i, s. 1S 1S t� 1S 
Given that each consumer is certain as to the spot market price vector 
that will occur in any state of the environment s. it thus turns out 
that n. t (" ) = n. for all i, s. But. using (15), this means that 1S 1,S 1S 
at� ante Pareto optimum (in the original sense of this term), every 
consumer expects with certainty the same spot market price vector for 
any given state of the environment. In turns this means that the 
conditions (1) are satisfied. 
Since by definition there is market clearing at any 
equilibrium, it follows that a necessary and sufficient condition for 
an equilibrium of this economy to be an � ante Pareto optimum is that 
there is agreement among consumers as to the spot market price vector 
that will occur with certainty in any state of the environment. 
Write qst(i, s)c = qsc' since there is agreement among 
consumers as to spot market prices in any state s. Then the 
conditions (16) imply that 
p
sc1qsc = psd/qsd for all c,d and for all s. 
The idea behind the conditions (17) is this. With spot 
(17) 
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markets open at time 1, purchases and sales in the contingent claim 
markets at time 0 can be for speculative purposes (buying a claim on c 
to be delivered in state s. in order to resell it at a profit if state 
s occurs) or for the purpose of rearranging the distribution of the 
consumer's income among states. Suppose that (17) did not hold; in 
particular, suppose that Psc/qsc < Psd/qsd for some c. d. Then any 
consumer buying state s claims on c or d would purchase only claims on 
c. because for any given outlay at time o. this maximizes the amount 
of income received in state s. And any consumer selling claims would 
of course sell claims on d only, since this minimizes the amount of 
income sacrificed in state s in order to buy claims for other states. 
Hence arbitrage at time 0 will insure that there are no speculative 
profits to be made and that (17) holds. Further, when (17) holds, 
consumers are perfectly indifferent among portfolios of state s claims 
having the same market value at time 0, because any such portfolio 
will have the same value at time 1 (a value larger, of course, than 
the time 0 value of the portfolio). 
With indifference as to portfolios on the part of consumers. 
then for any state of the environment, the volume of claims on 
particular goods and the distribution of these claims among consumers 
are both unpredictable. as Svensson (1976) has noted. On the other 
hand, the spot market prices that will actually occur on spot markets 
at time 1 in state s depend, of course, in part on the volume of 
claims and the distribution of these claims. But this means that the 
market clearing spot market price vector for any state is then 
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unpredictable as well. Thus we have arrived at Svensson's paradoxical 
conclusion that in a futures market-spot market economy in which every 
consumer believes with certainty that a certain spot market price 
vector will occur in a given state of the environment, this induces 
behavior and market clearing conditions in futures markets that 
essentially guarantee that the expected spot market price vector will 
not occur. 
This means that while there is no planned speculation in this 
economy at an � .!a!!. Pareto optimum, nonetheless generally there will 
be speculative gains and losses for all consumers. Furthermore, there 
is another aspect of' this interesting situation that raises added 
difficulties for the reinterpretation of the optimality criterion. 
The problem is that consumers will presumably realize what we have 
seen�that if all of them are in unanimous agreement with certainty as 
to the occurrence of a spot market price vector, this in and of itself 
acts to essentially guarantee that this outcome will not occur. This 
will certainly have feedback effects on the beliefs of consumers; that 
is, as Radner (1970) has emphasized, probability beliefs of consumers 
as to the occurrence of endogenous events such as future spot market 
prices tend themselves to be endogenous and in particular to be 
influenced by observed prices in futures markets. Im. extreme instance 
of this would be a naive efficient market believer, who would take the 
time 0 prices in the contingent claims markets (discounted by 
probabilities of occurrence of states of the environment) as the best 
estimators of time 1 spot prices. 
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Im. alternative modeling of the competitive economy is 
suggested by Nagatani (1975), who envisages a security market open at 
time 0, securities paying off on the basis of occurrence of states of 
the environment, and spot markets for commodities active at time 1. 
First order conditions characterizing such an economy include 
where 
Kis 
Kis 
_ � _ Ps 
Kir 
- Kjr 
-
Pr 
for all i, j, r, s, 
t t( au. )(ax. t ) nist � aM15 c ; as before, t- c= istc ist 
from the dynamic programming approach 
0isc
xistc 
xistc (qst'Mist ) where Mist ct qstc x + Yis· 
Market clearing requires that 
it xistc 
and 
it 0 xistc 
� y. -
i� 1S 
for all s, t, c; 
for all s. 
(18) 
(19) 
(20) 
where yis is the number of securities owned by i that pay $1 if state 
s occurs. 
As in the contingent claim economy. given a twice 
differentiable strictly quasi-concave utility function and an interior 
maximum, at an � .!a!!. Pareto optimum, all consumers must be certain 
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as to the spot market price vector that will occur in any state of the 
environment. Given certainty as to spot market price vectors, the 
conditions that hold at an equilibrium become (nist(i.s))( aui f aui ) nirt(i, r) axist (i, s)c/ axirt (i, r)d 
for all i, r,s, c, d; and 
qst ( i. s)c 
qrt(i, r)d 
(:��i ) Ps �Jlist (i, s) a.M. 
1S 
for all i, s, 
where Vi = � PsYis • s� 
(21) 
(22) 
Equation (22) has an interpretation similar to that for (16). 
At a maximum of expected utility, the gain in expected utility from 
selling a security paying $1 if state s occurs must be equal to the 
loss in utility from paying $1 in state s, times the probability that 
state s will occur. 
As in the contingent claim economy, from (21) we can derive 
the conclusion that t(i, s) is independent of i, so that every consumer 
expects with certainty the same spot market price vector in any state 
s. It immediately follows that equilibrium positions of this economy 
are � ante Pareto optimal if and only if there is unanimous agreement 
among consumers as to the spot market price vector that will occur 
with certainty in any state of the environment. 
As in the contingent claim economy, no individual has 
anticipations of speculative gains. In contrast, however, in the 
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security market economy there are no realized speculative gains as 
well. Thus for the security market economy, certainty beliefs as to 
spot market prices are self-fulfilling whereas in the contingent claim 
economy they tend to be sel f-negating. This is a crucial distinction 
between the two institutions, in terms of allocative outcomes. 
Finally, we simply note that in an economy in which contingent 
claims or securities are indexed by spot market price vectors as well 
as by states of the environment, it clearly is still the case that� 
ante optimality (in the original sense) occurs if and only if there is 
unanimous agreement (with certainty) as to spot market prices in any 
state of the environment. The reason is that the original version of 
� ante optimality requires that the commodity bundles chosen by 
consumers not vary within a state of the environment, hence indexing 
by spot market price vectors offers no advantages over contracts 
indexed by states of the environment only, so far as attainment of an 
optimum is concerned. 
S. SU.MllARY 
Formally, the optimality properties of a contingent claim 
economy or a security market economy can be preserved with active spot 
markets by introducing claims that pay off on the joint occurrence of 
states of the environment and spot market price vectors. However this 
formal equivalence, as in the reinterpretation of the Arrow model, 
involves redefining an � � Pareto optimum in terms of consumers' 
subjective probabilities over states of the environment and spot 
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market price vectors. We have argued that this is a major revision of 
the original notion of� � optimality by making the concept of 
optimality a variable depend indirectly on the institutions for 
allocating resources. It also raises problems related to basing 
probability beliefs on observed future market prices, and it 
ressurects the ' ' Keynes problem' ' and the applicability of the 
subjective probability framework to characterize beliefs. Beyond_ 
this, the institution specific character of the revised notion of � 
ante optimality preserves efficiency of the competitive system at the 
expense of destroying unbiasedness. 
Returning to the original definition of an � � optimum, a 
condition necessary and sufficient for an economy with active spot 
markets to attain such an optimum has been derived. This condition is 
highly restrictive, involving unanimous agreement among consumers as 
to the spot market price vector that will occur with certainty in any 
state of the environment. Moreover, even with this restrictive 
condition satisfied, in a world with a complete set of contingent 
claims the resulting spot market equilibrium will generally not 
generate those spot market prices forecasted with certainty by all 
consumers, and will generally result in (unplanned) speculative gains 
and losses for all consumers. 
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